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UNCITRAL’s Unclear Transparency
Instrument: Fashioning the Form and
Application of a Legal Standard
Ensuring Greater Disclosure in
Investor-State Arbitrations
By Julie Lee
Abstract: Confidentiality in commercial arbitrations—a main feature of
international arbitration—is highly coveted by companies that safeguard their
reputation and proprietary information. However, secrecy may not be so
sacrosanct to investor-State arbitrations involving economic disputes between
sovereign States and private actors. Recognizing the different demands for
transparency in purely private versus investor-State arbitrations, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) tasked a
Working Group with drafting new transparency standards for incorporation into
the existing set of UNCITRAL Rules. In addition to evaluating the merits of the
desirability for increased disclosure in the arbitral process, this Comment
focuses on the importance of the form in which these standards are drafted as
well as the complexities surrounding the application of the standards to existing
and future treaties. For over two years, the forms and applications of
transparency standards were debated amidst a flurry of policy considerations.
Rather than probing the content of the proposal that recently emerged from this
debate, this Comment focuses on the policy considerations that went into
drafting the new standards. This Comment further advocates for a form and
application of the standards that best achieve the Commission’s objective in
promoting greater transparency in investor-State arbitrations. Under such a
rubric, party consent and autonomy should still be preserved and the application
of new transparency standards should remain consistent with the approaches
taken in the prior 2010 rule changes.

* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern School of Law, 2013; B.A., History, University of
Pennsylvania, 2007. I would like to thank Professor Lawrence Schaner for generously
sharing his expertise in international arbitration and the editors of this Comment for all the
hard work and laughs. I give special thanks to my family for their unwavering
encouragement and support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At its forty-eighth session held in New York during February of 2008,
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL
or the Commission) discussed the possibility of creating rules on
transparency for investment arbitrations 1 as part of the revisions to the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010 UNCITRAL Rules).2 However, the
task of crafting and incorporating transparency provisions as part of the
2010 UNCITRAL Rules was eventually shelved for future consideration;
the Commission maintained that the scope of the 2010 revisions would be

1

The terms “investment arbitration” and “investor-State arbitration” are used
interchangeably throughout this Comment.
2
See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitration and
Conciliation on the work of its 48th Sess., New York, U.S., Feb. 4–8, 2008, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/646 (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group Forty-Eighth
Session].

440

UNCITRAL’s Unclear Transparency Instrument
33:439 (2013)

limited to updating and modernizing the 1976 UNCITAL Rules.3 Any
wholesale revisions or complex modifications to the Rules, such as
designing transparency standards, would be revisited upon completion of
the 2010 changes. Accordingly, after the completion of the 2010
UNCITRAL Rules, delegates returned their attention to introducing
transparency standards to investment arbitrations.4
The development of the UNCITRAL Rules is a success story in itself.
Since their adoption in 1976, they have been hailed as “one of the most
widely recognized sets of rules for the settlement of disputes arising in the
context of international commerce.” 5 Since its inception, UNCITRAL has
facilitated ad hoc arbitrations to parties that prefer a method of dispute
resolution different from litigation.6 There are many advantages to
arbitration over litigation. For example, parties to arbitration may enjoy the
benefits of a more expedited and cost-efficient dispute resolution process
administered by a neutral tribunal than they would through litigation under
a foreign jurisdiction. Additionally, one of the most valued features of
international arbitration is the imposition of confidentiality restrictions over
the arbitration process, which allows parties to resolve their disputes outside
of the public arena. 7 This cloak of confidentiality has afforded a wide
swath of protection to commercial arbitrations—foregoing open hearings,
third-party participation, and public disclosure of documents, awards, and
damages.
Today, over thirty years have passed since the genesis of the 1976
UNCITRAL Rules. As the Commission seeks to incorporate transparency

3
See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Rep. of the Working Group II (Arbitration and
Conciliation) on the work of its 54th Sess., New York, U.S., Feb. 7–11, 2011, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/717 (Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth
Session].
4
See id.
5
Markus Wirth, The Current Revision of the UNCITRAL Rules, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (Christoph Müller & Antonio Rigozzi eds.,
2008), available at http://www.homburger.ch/fileadmin/publications/UONO26O_01.pdf.
6
Ad hoc arbitration is a proceeding that is not administered by an arbitral institution and
requires parties to make their own arrangements for the selection of arbitrators and for the
designation of rules, applicable law, procedures, and administrative support. See generally
PUBLISHER’S EDITORIAL STAFF, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES § 3:42 (2012).
7
Confidentiality is widely perceived to be a principle advantage to private arbitration as
compared with litigation. There is commonly an expectation that arbitration will take place
in privacy with limited disclosure of documents, hearings, and awards to the general public.
See Geoff Nicholas & Briana Young, Global Overview, in ARBITRATION WORLD:
JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISONS xi, xxvi (J. William Rowley ed., 2d ed. 2006). However,
where there is an absence of an explicit agreement on what should be held confidential, there
is little uniformity among arbitral institutions over which aspects of arbitration are subject to
public scrutiny. Id.
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standards to the UNCITRAL Rules for the first time in its history,
commentators remark that “the [original] drafters of the Rules could not
possibly have anticipated all of the difficulties that have emerged in the
international arbitral process.”8 Nevertheless, in the complex, modern
world that has arisen over thirty years of rapid globalization, the
Commission must and does recognize the importance and desirability of
enhancing transparency in investor-State arbitrations.
When considering transparency standards, investor-State arbitrations
should be distinguished from purely private or commercial arbitrations. In
investor-State arbitrations, States are parties to the dispute, and government
activities may be subject to basic requirements of transparency and public
participation.9 Claims against the State are usually based on international
legal obligations found in treaties, “such as the obligation not to expropriate
except for a public purpose, without discrimination, and on payment of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.” 10 Provisions geared
towards increased transparency could enhance the public understanding of
the arbitration process and its overall credibility. Thus, while companies
that safeguard their reputation and proprietary information covet
confidentiality in commercial arbitrations, secrecy in investor-State
arbitrations may not be as sacrosanct to sovereign government parties
involved in treaty disputes.
The incorporation of transparency provisions is more easily proposed
than achieved. The 1976 UNCITRAL Rules were designed and enacted
with the purpose of facilitating the expeditious and effective settlement of
commercial disputes. 11 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were not
initially designed as a public mechanism for settling disputes since
investment arbitration was far less common in the 1970s than today.12
However, even today the vast majority of arbitrations facilitated by the
UNCITRAL Rules remain commercial in nature. Therefore, UNCITRAL’s
challenge is to strike the proper balance of incorporating transparency
standards (unanticipated by the original drafters) that will not drastically
8
JAN PAULSSON & GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, REVISION OF THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES 2 (2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/arbrules_report.pdf.
9
Investor-State arbitrations provide foreign investors rights to seek redress for damages
arising out of alleged breaches of investment-related obligations by host governments.
Investor-State arbitrations have grown in popularity over the past two decades because of the
procedure’s advantages: investor disputes are resolved by mechanisms and institutions
governed by international standards, rather than the inherently conflicting jurisdictions of
domestic, host States. See generally Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of
Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (2009).
10
Id.
11
See Jonathan Sutcliffe & Anibal Sabater, UNCITRAL Arbitration: New Rules on
Transparency?, 23 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., May 2008, at 32, 33.
12
Id.
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alter the original structure, spirit, or drafting style of the text. 13
An assembly of delegates that comprise the Working Group II recently
reached a long-awaited consensus on a draft proposal of the new
transparency standards.14 This Comment does not probe into the content of
the new transparency standards themselves. Rather, this Comment focuses
on the challenges surrounding the form and application of the new
standards. The task of designing and incorporating transparency standards
is not merely a rote technical exercise; it entails a careful deliberation and
sifting of weighty policy considerations.
This Comment contends that in order to promote and legitimize greater
public disclosure and access to investor-State disputes, UNCITRAL
transparency standards should take the form of binding rules applicable to
(a) existing treaties by express consent and (b) future treaties by default.
These recommendations aim to recognize party autonomy and the principle
of contractual respect in the pursuit for greater transparency.
This Comment first examines the rise in popularity of investor-State
arbitrations and the increasing use of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in Part
II. Next, Part III explores the case for transparency and then discusses the
merits of greater disclosure in investment arbitrations. In Part IV, this
Comment takes lesson from the developments of transparency rules and
guidelines issued by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
Part V introduces the Working Group that was tasked with drafting the
transparency standards. More importantly, Part V advocates for the form in
which UNCITRAL transparency provisions should be drafted and argues
that the standards should apply differently to existing and future treaties.
Part VI concludes this Comment.

13

See Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 43rd Sess., June 21–July 9, 2010,
U.N. Doc. A/65/17, annex I; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2010) [hereinafter 2010
UNCITRAL
Arbitration
Rules],
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
14
At the Working Group II meetings in October of 2012, “some issues were settled,
[while] many very significant ones remain[ed] contentious . . . .” Lise Johnson, Inching
Towards Consensus: An Update on the UNCITRAL Transparency Negotiations, INVESTMENT
TREATY NEWS (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/30/inching-towardsconsensus-an-update-on-the-uncitral-transparency-negotiations/. The Working Group II
reconvened in February 2013, at which time they finally reached a consensus on a draft
version of the transparency standards, which “must still be subjected to a ‘legal scrub’ and
then approved by the UNCITRAL Commission at its next meeting in July in Vienna.” Luke
Eric Peterson, UN Working Group Finalizes UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, but They
Won’t Apply Automatically to Stockpiles of Existing Investment Treaties, INVESTMENT ARB.
REP. (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20130215_4.
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II.

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION
The popularity of international arbitration continues to grow.
According to the 2010 International Arbitration Survey, international
arbitration is the dispute resolution mechanism of choice for many
corporations.15
Private investors have demonstrated an increased
willingness to rely on international investment agreements to resolve
transnational disputes. 16 Likewise, international arbitration is a popular
form of investment dispute resolution and protection between a State and
foreign investors. Investment-treaty or State arbitrations, in which States
are held accountable by private foreign investors for alleged breaches of
their international obligations, have multiplied over the past decades with
the growth of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment treaties. 17
States have resorted to investment treaties to ensure that among the parties
to an agreement or negotiation, there would be definitive rules relating to
foreign investment. 18 The dramatic growth of investment arbitration is
“largely the result of the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs),19 and free trade agreements20 at the bilateral, regional, and
interregional levels, which allow private investors to resort to arbitration to
protect their commercial interests against measures adopted by States in
their sovereign capacity.”21
Direct arbitration between the host State and the foreign investor is the
preferred option for the settlement of investment disputes.22 International
15
See generally PAUL FRIEDLAND & LOUKAS MISTRELIS, WHITE & CASE LLP, 2010
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1, 6
(2011),
available
at
http://www.arbitrationonline.org/docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf.
16
Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the
Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 L. &
BUS. REV. AM. 885, 886 (2007).
17
Judith Levine, Current Trends in International Arbitral Practice as Reflected in the
Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 31 U.N.S.W. L.J. 266, 278 (2008).
18
M. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 233 (1994).
19
BITs are “agreements between two countries for the reciprocal encouragement,
promotion and protection of investments in each other’s territories by companies based in
either country.”
What are BITs?, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE DEV.,
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1006.aspx (last updated Aug. 17, 2004).
20
A free trade agreement is an agreement between two or more countries to establish a
free trade area where commerce in goods and services can be conducted across their
common borders without tariffs or hindrances, but capital or labor may not move freely. See
Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.gov/fta/ (last visited Mar. 10,
2013).
21
Tuck, supra note 16, at 885–86.
22
Surridge & Beecheno, Arbitration/ADR Versus Litigation, HG.ORG (Sept. 4, 2006),
http://www.hg.org/articles/article_1530.html.
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arbitration provides an attractive alternative to the settlement of investment
disputes by national courts or through diplomatic protection. 23 Investors
rarely view the settlement of a dispute through a host State’s court as
sufficiently impartial. 24 Additionally, regular courts may in fact lack the
neutrality required to resolve complex international investment disputes. 25
Diplomatic protections, moreover, are discretionary, meaning the investor
has no right to them. Therefore, it is not surprising that investment disputes
are commonly settled through international arbitration.
Most investor-State arbitrations are conducted under the ICSID Rules,
the ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, or the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.26 The second most common type of investor-State
arbitration after the institutional form of arbitration is the ad hoc form
pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules. 27 The UNCITRAL Rules are the most
popular rules for ad hoc arbitrations. 28 Of the over 219 known investorState arbitrations to date, about thirty percent have used the UNCITRAL
Rules.29
III. THE CASE FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY
The rise of investor-State arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules
23

See Steven P. Finizio et al., Recent Developments in Investor-State Arbitration:
Effective Use of Provisional Measures, in EUROPEAN ARBITRATION REVIEW: GLOBAL
ARBITRATION
REVIEW
SPECIAL
REPORT
15,
15
(2007),
available
at
http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/d76150c5-651f-4fb2-ae402334c60fe8ca/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b8503dde-d3c8-4c8d-9cc92c180a7203d3/investor_state_arbitration.pdf.
24
Id.
25
Id. (noting that international investment agreements are designed to guarantee legal
protections “above and beyond that provided by the host state’s laws. Equally important,
they usually provide for [an arbitration system that includes] a neutral forum for resolving
disputes with local government entities, which allows foreign investors to avoid the local
courts when such disputes arise—a particularly valuable benefit in countries with unreliable,
inefficient (or even corrupt) judicial systems.”).
26
More than sixty percent of investor-State arbitrations are brought under the ICSID
Convention and proceed under the ICSID Arbitration Rules or the ICSID Additional Facility
Rules United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Gary B. Born & Ethan G.
Shenkman, Confidentiality and Transparency in Commercial and Investor-State
International Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 5, 28 (Catherine A.
Rogers & Roger P. Alfred eds., 2009); see also U. N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Latest
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, [2008] IIA Monitor, No. 1, at 1–2, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2008/3.
27
See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., supra note 26; see generally supra note 6 (defining
what an ad hoc arbitration consists of).
28
See A Comparison Between the ICC Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, ALWAYS ASSOCIATES (Feb. 2005), http://www.alway-associates.co.uk/legalupdate/article.asp?id=72.
29
Tuck, supra note 16, at 886.
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raises issues regarding public disclosure and accessibility. Arbitrations
involving a State are markedly different from commercial arbitrations
involving only private parties, because the latter do not implicate public
interest concerns in ways that the former do. Purely commercial arbitration,
agreed upon between private parties without registration or publication of
final decisions, “does not offend fundamental principles of justice, nor does
it as such involve questions of democratic legitimacy” so long as the
dispute does not pertain to matters of public policy. 30 In general, arbitration
is a private process, and confidentiality is widely perceived to be one of the
key advantages to arbitration. 31 Commercial arbitration exercises higher
degrees of confidentiality and privacy through means of closed doors and
unpublished awards rather than judicial proceedings before courts of law. 32
Regulatory measures taken because of legitimate government concerns in
investor-State arbitrations, on the other hand, demand more accountability
and greater scrutiny by the public.33 “Arbitrations brought by foreign
investors against governments under the auspices of bilateral and
multilateral investment treaties”34 give rise to special issues of public
interest:
[T]he very presence of a State as a party to the arbitration raises a
public interest because the nationals and residents of that State have
an interest in how government acts during the arbitration and in the
outcome of the arbitration. Moreover, the existence of this public
interest has obvious implications for the conduct of the arbitration:
according to principles of human rights law and good governance,
government activities should be subject to basic requirements of
transparency and public participation.35

The case for increased transparency and third party participation
mostly centers on “the more prominent notions of democratic legitimacy”
of good governance. 36 Investor-State arbitration has the potential to

30
Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Third-Party Participation (NGO’s and Private Persons) and
Transparency in ICSID Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID): TAKING STOCK AFTER 40 YEARS 179, 180
(Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2007); see generally Nigel Blackaby, Public
Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 355 (2004).
31
See Nicholas & Young, supra note 7, at xii.
32
See Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 14.
33
Levine, supra note 17, at 279.
34
Id.
35
CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., REVISING THE
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES TO ADDRESS INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS 4 (rev. ed.
2007),
available
at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/CIEL_IISD_RevisingUNCITRAL_Dec07.pdf.
36
Zoellner, supra note 30, at 200.
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significantly affect the public interest, not merely because a State may be a
party to the dispute, but mainly because many of the issues at stake impact
the provision and costs of public goods and services. 37 Some examples of
recent investment arbitration cases implicating public interests include:
water supply systems in South America, regulation of hazardous waste by
Canada and Mexico, fiscal responses by Argentina, and positive racial
discrimination laws in South America.38 These cases are brought in
increasing numbers under the UNCITRAL Rules on an ad hoc basis, but the
Rules are silent as to the issue of transparency.39
The issue of transparency has risen to prominence in the international
arbitration community in recent years. 40 For example, there has been a
movement towards wider publication of awards over the last twenty years.41
This movement has been undertaken “in the interests of establishing a body
of decisions that may be a useful reference for arbitrators” and thus has
been instrumental in building a body of case law. 42
Another motivation for promulgating rules for better transparency is
the benefit of allowing third party participation in the arbitration process.
Third party amicus submissions enhance the availability of knowledge and
information pertaining to a certain dispute. Non-disputing parties may file
amicus curiae briefs to enlighten the tribunal about important aspects of a
case that have been omitted from the parties’ own submissions. 43 The
parties to the dispute may overlook supplemental concerns, fail to provide
key information either due to a lack of expertise on a subject,44 or lack a
personal stake in the outcome of certain public matters. 45 It is a truism that
37

See id.
See generally CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
supra note 35.
39
Wirth, supra note 5, at 16.
40
See generally infra Part V.
41
An example of published awards may be found at Search Online Decisions and
Awards,
INT’L
CENTER
FOR
SETTLEMENT
INVESTMENT
DISPUTES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=Main&ac
tionVal=OnlineAward (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). Certain investor-State awards can also be
found at New Awards, Decisions and Materials, INVESTMENT TREATY ARB.,
http://ita.law.uvic.ca (last visited Jan. 3, 2013), and certain awards under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules are available at Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), UNITED
NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html (last
visited Jan. 3, 2012).
42
See Nicholas & Young, supra note 7, at xvii.
43
See, e.g., Whitney Debevoise, Key Procedural Issues: Transparency—Access to
Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice and Suggestions for Greater
Transparency, 32 INT’L L. 817, 837–38 (1998) (discussing a case where NGOs prepared
amicus briefs covering environmental issues that were not addressed by arbitrating parties).
44
See id.
45
See Dora Marta Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in International
38
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the quality and availability of information leads to better, more informed
decision-making. The Working Group II on Arbitration and Conciliation
has thus expressed broad support for greater transparency in investor-State
arbitrations, which invariably affect the public interest. 46
IV. NAFTA & ICSID: THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS
TRANSPARENCY
The transparency movement has received significant traction over the
past decade as evidenced by the application of transparency standards by a
number of arbitral institutions, countries, and investment agreements. 47 The
trend in increasing transparency signifies an accord among members of the
public that they recognize a legitimate public interest in investment
arbitration.48 In tracing the evolution of increased expectation for greater
transparency and openness in international investment arbitration, this Part
examines how NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitrations—including the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission’s Interpretations and Guidelines, and the 2006
Amendments to ICSID Rules—have taken the lead in this area. An
examination of how transparency standards operate under NAFTA
arbitrations and ICSID Rules serves various purposes for this Comment.
Most importantly, it highlights the growing trend in investor-State
arbitration towards greater transparency, and provides precedential value
that may be instructive for the UNCITRAL in formulating and applying its
own transparency standards.
Notably, UNCITRAL cannot draw a direct analogy from existing
transparency standards, because the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules differ
Arbitration: The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
923, 955–56 (2003).
46
The Working Group II agreed to the importance of transparency upon considering
written observations that addressed public interest policy. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes, Revision of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, Observations by the Government of Canada, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/662
(June 12, 2008) (“Investment arbitration often implicates the public interest and government
policy in ways simply not salient in commercial arbitration.”).
47
For example, the permissibility of amicus curiae participation has been supported by
the practice of NAFTA, the Iran-United States Claims tribunal, and the World Trade
Organization. When looking at the most recent versions of prominent national model BITs,
disclosure policies applied by NAFTA countries, and recent practice of investor-State
arbitration tribunals, there is currently a general trend towards transparency in international
investment arbitration. Barton Legum, Trends and Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration,
19 ARB. INT’L 143, 144 (2003); see generally Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in
International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third Party
Participation, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 200 (2011).
48
Ruth Teitelbaum, A Look At The Public Interest In Investment Arbitration: Is It
Unique? What Should We Do About It?, 5 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 54, 54 (2010),
available at http://bjil.typepad.com/teitelbaum_final-1.pdf.
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from the ICSID Rules and NAFTA Chapter Eleven guidelines in a
nontrivial way: UNCITRAL Rules operate in ad hoc arbitrations and are not
limited to any treaty’s States signatories.49 In contrast, ICSID Rules
facilitate institutional rather than ad hoc arbitration, meaning that ICSID
services and conducts arbitrations under the supervision of its established
arbitral institution. 50 The particular advantages of an ad hoc versus
institutional arbitration appeal to different audiences; accordingly,
distinguishing attributes are oftentimes desired. However, the ways in
which NAFTA’s and ICSID’s transparency standards furnish the public
with greater access to investment arbitrations act as a point of reference for
structuring transparency rules in other contexts, including the ad hoc
arbitrations conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules. Thereon, the
UNCITRAL can determine whether its Arbitration Rules should remain
consistent with or depart from current practices.
A. NAFTA at the Helm of the Transparency Movement
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represents “the
most concerted effort to date to increase transparency and reduce or
eliminate confidentiality in investor-State proceedings.”51 NAFTA is a
trilateral free trade deal among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.52
NAFTA Chapter Eleven specifically deals with investment treaties, and
allows individuals or corporations to sue any signatories of the NAFTA
when an investment is adversely impacted by government action. 53 This
subpart highlights: (1) the progressive steps taken by NAFTA parties to
achieve greater public disclosure of arbitral proceedings; and (2) how the
NAFTA regime has pushed arbitration proceedings into the open forum
through guidelines and interpretations. Notably, the force of NAFTA
guidelines or interpretations is weighted against the rules administered by

49

Born & Shenkman, supra note 26; North American Free Trade Agreement § 1B et
seq., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, available at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpiID=142#A1115 [hereinafter NAFTA].
50
See A Primer on International Arbitration, COVINGTON & BURLING 5 (May 1998),
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/f394b11c-381d-4838-a6e202812ed6b093/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/969db08e-5cc1-4f3f-a72e034ca2c8e9b2/oid6181.PDF (“Institutions that employ professional staffs can provide a wide
range of services that may not be available in an ad hoc arbitration. For instance, institutions
can act as appointing authorities when parties cannot agree on the appointment of a sole
arbitrator, or when party-appointed arbitrators cannot agree on the appointment of a neutral
arbitrator. They also can supervise proceedings, assist the arbitrators when necessary, fix the
remuneration of arbitrators, and collect any advances against the costs of arbitration.”).
51
Born & Shenkman, supra note 26, at 31.
52
Lee Hudson Teslik, NAFTA’s Economic Impact, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 7,
2009), http://www.cfr.org/economics/naftas-economic-impact/p15790#p2.
53
NAFTA, supra note 49, arts. 1116–1117.
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ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility, or UNCITRAL selected by the investor
in the arbitration.
1. NAFTA’s Progressive Measures
NAFTA Chapter Eleven’s arbitration regime has given attention to
policies that make transparency a critical part of investor-State arbitrations
involving NAFTA governments. In particular, NAFTA Chapter Eleven has
favorably addressed the issues of public access to documents, third-party
participation,54 and open hearings.55
On July 31, 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (NAFTA
FTC), pursuant to its authority to interpret NAFTA provisions, issued an
interpretation in favor of public access to documents (Document Access
Interpretation).56 The NAFTA FTC, comprised of Trade Ministers from
each of the three NAFTA governments, states in its Document Access
Interpretation that “[n]othing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of
confidentiality on the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven
arbitration . . . .”57 The Document Access Interpretation further states:
Each Party agrees to make available to the public in a timely manner
all documents submitted to . . . a Chapter Eleven tribunal, subject to
redaction of: (i) confidential business information; (ii) information
which is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under the
Party’s domestic law . . . .58

The Document Access Interpretation clarified NAFTA’s endorsement
for public access to documents generated during investor-State arbitrations
held in Chapter Eleven tribunals. In the aftermath of the Interpretation,
Chapter Eleven tribunals have effectively put into practice the standard for
public document disclosure: the public has nearly unfettered access to
relevant documents generated during arbitration proceedings. 59
54
See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., NAFTA Commission Announces
New Transparency Measures (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/press-releases/archives/2003/october/nafta-commission-announces-new-transparen.
55
See Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE
(Oct.
7,
2003),
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset_upload_file1
43_3602.pdf.
56
NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Notes on Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions,
U.S.
DEP’T
ST.
(July
31,
2001),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf. NAFTA FTC interpretations are
binding on NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals. NAFTA, supra note 49, art. 1131.
57
NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, supra note 56, ¶ A.1.
58
Id. ¶ A.2(b)
59
Andrea J. Menaker, Piercing the Veil of Confidentiality: The Recent Trend Towards
Greater Public Participation and Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration, in
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The practice of allowing non-disputing parties to file written
submissions has also gained substantial ground with NAFTA Chapter
Eleven arbitrations. The Canadian government recently submitted a
comment to the UNCITRAL Working Group, stating that “Canada’s
experience . . . with respect to amicus curiae participation is that, as long as
reasonable limits are established, amicus submissions can be a benefit for
the [t]ribunal.”60 In this regard, the NAFTA FTC issued a Statement of the
Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing Party Participation in 2003
(Non-disputing Party Statement).61 In this Statement, the NAFTA FTC
provided the following interpretation:
1. No provision of [NAFTA] limits a tribunal’s discretion to accept
written submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing
party . . . .
2. Nothing in this statement by the [FTC] prejudices the rights of
NAFTA Parties under Article 1128 of the NAFTA.62

According to the Non-disputing Party Statement, the tribunal has the
discretion to determine whether an interested amicus is to participate: “The
disputing parties are permitted to comment on whether the tribunal should
grant leave for the amicus to file, but the tribunal may, in principle, accept
the submission over the objection of both disputing parties.” 63 The Nondisputing Party Statement recommends that:
[I]n exercising its discretion, the tribunal should consider a number
of factors designed to help it determine whether or not the amicus
submission will be helpful to the tribunal—these include whether the
amicus has knowledge or insight different from the parties and
whether there is both an interest of the amicus and of the public in
the dispute.64

Recognizing that written submissions by non-disputing parties may
affect the operation of Chapter Eleven arbitration, the Non-disputing Party
ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY
ISSUES 129, 134 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010).
60
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes,
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, Comments of the Governments of
Canada and of the United States of America on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State
Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement, § 1.III, at
4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.163 (Dec. 7, 2010).
61
Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation,
NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Nondisputing-en.pdf.
62
Id. ¶ A.
63
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 60.
64
Id.

451

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:439 (2013)

Statement also contains detailed, nonbinding65 guidelines for evaluating
amicus petitions: “an interested amicus must request leave to file a
submission, amicus submissions must be in written form and must be
attached to the application for leave, and the submission cannot be more
than [twenty] pages in length. In preparing submissions, amicus have
access only to the publicly available documents.” 66
Finally, the initiative for open hearings in investor-State arbitrations
under NAFTA Chapter Eleven has also seen incremental progress since the
NAFTA FTC issued a statement in October 2003 consenting to open all
Chapter Eleven hearings to the public (Open Hearings Statement).67 The
Open Hearings Statement provides that “hearings in Chapter Eleven
disputes [must] be open to the public, except to ensure the protection of
confidential information, including business confidential information.”68
The Open Hearings Statement recommends several possible arrangements
for open hearings, such as closed-circuit television systems and online
webcasting.69 The NAFTA regime’s pioneering movement towards a more
transparent arbitration regime—through its endorsement of public
disclosure of documents, third party participation, and open hearings—has
been influential in the international community of investment arbitrations.
2. Limitations of NAFTA’s Interpretations
As a leader of the transparency movement, the NAFTA FTC has
issued interpretations promoting obligations of transparency in investorState treaties in the form of statements and guidelines. The issued
statements and guidelines are somewhat constrained, however, because
disputing parties are still subject to the administering rules selected at the
time of arbitration. 70 Treaties referencing ICSID Rules, ICSID Additional
Facility Rules, or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are bound by legal
standards set forth by the relevant institution or intergovernmental
65
66
67

Menaker, supra note 59, at 143.
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 60.
See Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, supra note

55.
68

Settlement of Disputes Between a Party and an Investor of Another Party, FOREIGN
AFF. & INT’L TRADE CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-transparency-alena-transparence.aspx?lang=en&view=d (last
visited Jan. 3, 2013).
69
Id.
70
As an example of a case that involved a NAFTA dispute that proceeded under the
UNCITRAL Rules, Methanex was the first case to recognize the “privilege” of third parties
to participate as amicus curiae in investment arbitration proceedings. Methanex Corp. v.
United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as
Amici Curiae, ¶¶ 52–53 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Jan. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/methanex_tribunal_first_amicus_decision.pdf.
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organization. The investor-State arbitration mechanism, set forth in
NAFTA Chapter Eleven, does not provide express provisions addressing
any obligations of confidentiality or public disclosure during the arbitral
process.71 Where NAFTA’s text and the governing arbitration rules are
silent on such obligations, relevant administering rules may explicitly state
otherwise. For example, a private investor may initiate an arbitration
against a NAFTA party before a Chapter Eleven tribunal under the
UNCITRAL Rules. In such a case, NAFTA’s texts have been silent on
issues of public document disclosure and third-party participation, but open
hearings are subject to the governing UNCITRAL Rule, which states that
“[h]earings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise.”72
Despite NAFTA’s consent to open hearings, the UNCITRAL Rules require
the claimant party to consent before hearings can be made open.73 Such
consent has been given in some, but not all cases.74 Consequently, the
NAFTA regime’s initiative for open hearings in investment arbitrations has
seen only marginal change.
In light of this, UNCITRAL, in determining the form, applicability,
and content of its transparency standards, should note that legal standards in
the form of rules have greater authority than guidelines or interpretations.
NAFTA’s interpretations and recommendations on third-party participation,
open hearings, and public disclosures are nonbinding. However, the
standards relating to these issues that UNCITRAL administers can have the
force of binding rules if desired.
B. ICSID’s Newly Amended Rules Designed to Achieve Greater
Transparency
The majority of investor-State arbitrations have been administered by
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID):
more than sixty percent of investment arbitrations proceed under the ICSID
Arbitration Rules or ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 75 Therefore, it is
worthwhile to examine how ICSID has addressed the demand for greater
transparency by incorporating several amendments into its rules.
ICSID amended its arbitration rules in 2006 to address the growing
popularity of investor-State arbitrations (2006 ICSID Amendments). The
71

Id. ¶¶ 9, 24, 38, 39.
2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, art. 28(3). For another example,
the Mondev tribunal prohibited the United States from publishing on its website a tribunal
order and interim decision pursuant to the then-existing ICSID Additional Facility Rule in
Article 44(2). Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 26, 28 (Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 192 (2004).
73
Menaker, supra note 59, at 155.
74
See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 60, at 12.
75
Born & Shenkman, supra note 26.
72
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number of bilateral treaties arbitrated under the ICSID convention has
exploded in recent years. 76 Investors have been equipped with the right to
bring ICSID arbitration claims against States based on “[n]umerous
multilateral agreements, such as the Energy Charter Treaty, NAFTA, and
the recently-concluded Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA).”77 The 2006 ICSID Amendments were “intended to make
ICSID proceedings more streamlined and transparent, while instilling
greater confidence in the arbitral process.” 78
1. ICSID’S Progressive Measures
ICSID implemented several rule changes to satisfy demands for
increased access to investor-State arbitration proceedings by the public.
ICSID aims to achieve greater transparency via amicus submissions by
third parties, public attendance at oral hearings, and publication of awards.
ICSID has provided new standards and procedures that enable greater
public participation in investment arbitrations.
The 2006 ICSID
Amendments require tribunals to consider third-party requests to file
amicus briefs so that issues inadequately addressed by treaty parties may
have an opportunity to be addressed by the broader public. For example,
there are issues that may arise in an arbitration proceeding that may be
overlooked by the treaty parties themselves, but that may be significant to
the public at large, such as environmental or trade issues. ICSID does not
restrict the type of third parties that may make a submission as indicated by
its reference to non-disputing parties as any “persons or entity” 79 that meets
certain requirements. The broad wording of “persons or entity” is inclusive
of private citizens, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business
organizations, and local and national governments. Moreover, the 2006
ICSID Amendments have made great strides towards transparency by
authorizing tribunals to accept amicus submissions by third parties even if
both parties object. However, the tribunal is required to consult both parties
before ruling on an amicus request if accepted over both parties’
objections.80
76

Gary Born et al., Investment Treaty Arbitration: ICSID Amends Investor-State
Arbitration
Rules,
WILMERHALE
(Apr.
14,
2006),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandNewsDetail.aspx?NewsPubId=90393.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
“After consulting both parties, the tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a
party to the dispute . . . to file a written submission with the tribunal regarding a matter
within the scope of the dispute.” Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], ICSID
Convention, Regulations and Rules, rule 37(2), at 117, ICSID Doc. ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006),
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf
[hereinafter ICSID Rules].
80
Id.
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In addition to amicus submissions, the 2006 ICSID Amendments
address transparency objectives by opening ICSID hearings to the public. 81
Transparency advocates, such as NGOs and civil society organizations,
have pushed for open hearings to persons other than those directly involved
in the arbitration proceeding. 82 The revised rules partly meet this demand
by giving tribunals the power to permit persons besides the parties and their
agents to attend the hearings, or even open them to the public, but only with
the consent of both parties. 83 The rule is still mindful of certain
confidentiality concerns, as it requires tribunals presiding over open
proceedings to “establish procedures for the protection of proprietary or
privileged information.”84
The 2006 ICSID Amendments also further ICSID’s transparency
objectives by instituting a rule that facilitates the timely publication of
awards by making such publication mandatory.85 The revised rule prohibits
ICSID from publishing an award without the consent of both parties. 86 If
there is no consent between the parties, ICSID must promptly publish
excerpts of the legal conclusions of the tribunal. 87 In contrast, the old rules
authorized but did not mandate ICSID to publish excerpts of the awards that
revealed the tribunal’s reasoning.88 Moreover, in the old rules, there were
no provisions as to the promptness in publishing legal excerpts of the
awards, occasionally leading to delayed publications that took several
months.89 In publicizing basic information “on every investor-State dispute
that it registers, ICSID arbitration distinguishes itself from most other forms
of international arbitration, where the existence of a dispute . . . is not made
public contemporaneously and may remain permanently confidential.” 90
ICSID has revised its rules to further its objective of streamlining
81

Id. rule 32, at 115.
See, e.g., CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra
note 35 (commenting on the initiatives of the Center for International Environmental Law
and the International Institute for Sustainable Development).
83
“Unless either party objects, the tribunal, after consultation with the SecretaryGeneral, may allow other persons, besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates,
witnesses and experts during their testimony, and officers of the tribunal, to attend or
observe all or part of the hearings . . . .” ICSID Rules, supra note 79, rule 32(2), at 115.
84
Id.
85
Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall & Ank Santens, ICSID Amends Its Arbitration
Rules,
WHITE
&
CASE
LLP
(Oct.
2006),
http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/e6da84a5-e1a8-462a-89e3147a369efdb8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/232b4eb2-3248-48f9-aca516652b545fd8/article_Icsid_Amends_its_Arbitration_Rules.pdf.
86
ICSID Rules, supra note 79, rule 48, at 122.
87
Id.
88
Tuck, supra note 16, at 900.
89
Id.
90
Born & Shenkman, supra note 26.
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greater transparency. The 2006 ICSID Amendments—by promoting
amicus participation, open hearings, and publication of awards—are
significant changes to its existing rules and will affect the greater majority
of investment arbitrations that proceed under ICSID.
2. ICSID’s Transparency Rules in Amended Form
Unlike NAFTA guidelines and interpretations, the 2006 ICSID
Amendments are binding on arbitrations subject to the institution. The
rules governing transparency, effective as of April 10, 2006, were directly
incorporated into the existing 1966 version of the ICSID rules, giving the
Amendments binding force.91 Rather than having issued interpretive
statements favoring greater transparency, ICSID designed transparency
standards as revisions to its existing regulations. ICSID goes further in
administering new transparency standards. The 2006 ICSID Amendments
apply to disputes that arise on or after the effective date, even if the
investment treaties themselves were signed prior to 2006.92
The 2006 ICSID Amendments were a response to the proliferation of
investor-State arbitrations and the evolution of the growing body of
international investment law.
ICSID departed from the previously
prevailing trend of dealing with transparency issues in the context of
voluntary guidelines for foreign investors. Rather, it sought to legitimize its
transparency objectives and give the revised rules a binding effect.
Likewise, in order for UNCITRAL to reach its objective in promoting
greater transparency to ad hoc arbitrations, its transparency standards
should be crafted and administered as rules so that they have a greater
governing force than guidelines and interpretations.
UNCITRAL’S COMMITMENT TO ESTABLISHING
TRANSPARENCY STANDARDS
The incorporation of transparency standards into the current
UNCITRAL Rules signifies no small change or minimal effort by the
Commission. In 2010, UNCITRAL adopted a new version of its
Arbitration Rules thirty-four years after their inception. The adoption of the
2010 UNCITRAL Rules concluded four years of drafting work by
UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Working Group, which produced important
additions to the text after thorough debates and deliberations during the
V.

91

For example, subsection (2) of Rule 37 is a completely new addition to the 1966
version of the rule. Subsection (2) of Rule 37, which deals with submissions of nondisputing parties, has been incorporated in its entirety as an amendment to the old rule. See
ICSID Rules, supra note 79, rule 37(2), at 117. The rule was previously only concerned
with the tribunal’s ability to visit places connected to the dispute.
92
Born et al., supra note 76.
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eight weeks of its meeting.93 The Working Group II approached the task of
revising the already functional and largely successful UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules with the rule of consensus: “no revision was adopted
unless it garnered virtually unanimous support among the delegates.”94
Though the rule of consensus required lengthy debates, “it was crucial to
obtaining broad acceptance of the revisions within the international
community.”95
Likewise, the Working Group II approached the adoption of a
transparency standard—which will affect all states arbitrating under
UNCITRAL Rules—with the principle that broad-based support is required
for effective implementation of existing and future treaties. The Working
Group II is, therefore, composed of varied interests and governments.96 To
further garner broad international support for transparency standards, the
Working Group II operated on a consent-based approach.97 This approach
strategically allows future users of newly revised or introduced rules to
“take comfort from the fact that representatives from a wide range of legal
and economic systems have approved them.” 98
The issue of the need for greater transparency with the rise of investorState arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules received great attention in the
Working Group sessions, transparency standards were eventually tabled for

93

Working Group II is one of six working groups “undertak[ing] the substantive
preparatory work on [various] topics” covered by the UNCITRAL program. FAQ—Methods
of
Work,
UNITED
NATIONS
COMMISSION
ON
INT’L
TRADE
L.,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/methods_faq.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
Working Group II, was designated to work on drafting the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules. See
Levine, supra note 17, at 268. Working Group II has now been tasked with setting a
standard on transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitrations. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation on the work of its 55th
Sess., Oct. 3–7, 2011, ¶ 1, U.N. DOC. A/CN.9/736 (Oct. 17, 2011). For a list of all six
working groups and their respective tasks, see Working Group Documents, UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION
ON
INT’L
TRADE
L.,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups.html (last visited Jan. 3,
2013).
94
James E. Castello, Unveiling the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 65 J. DISP.
RESOL., May/Oct. 2010, at 21, 21.
95
Id.
96
Working Group II is composed primarily of delegations from the sixty member States
of UNCITRAL as well as observer groups from arbitral institutions and think tanks. Levine,
supra note 17, at 268. The composition of this working group reflects growing collaboration
among governments, organizations, and practitioners. Id. at 269. Among those in
attendance at the Working Group II sessions were a host of observers from the United
Nations System, international intergovernmental organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations. Id. at 268–69; see also Report of the Working Group FiftyFourth Session, supra note 3, ¶¶ 5–9.
97
See Castello, supra note 92, at 21.
98
Id.
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future discussion. In launching the revision project, the Working Group
was “tasked by UNCITRAL to ‘modernize the Rules and to promote greater
efficiency in arbitral proceedings.’” 99 The “focus of the revision should be
on updating the Rules to meet changes that had taken place over the last
thirty years in arbitral practice,” not to radically change the UNCITRAL
Rules’ form and substance100:
In recognition of the success and status of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, the Commission was generally of the view that
any revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules should not alter
the structure of the text, its spirit or its drafting style, and should
respect the flexibility of the text rather than make it more
complex.101

Thus, the updates were designed to accommodate developments in arbitral
practice and make some procedural aspects of the UNCITRAL Rules more
efficient.102
While the 2008 New York Working Group meeting saw broad support
for the principle of greater transparency in investor-State arbitrations that
affect the public interest, it was agreed that such changes should not be
introduced until after the passage of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules. The
reason for shelving transparency reforms until after completion of the 2010
UNCITRAL Rules was that UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules largely apply to
commercial arbitration, while only a small percentage arise under
investment treaties.
Broad support for transparency standards was not met without serious
concerns. While the Working Group II expressed general agreement
“regarding the desirability of dealing with transparency in investor-State
arbitration, which differ[s] from purely private arbitration, where
confidentiality was an essential feature,”103 there were reservations about
issuing full transparency in all respects, as investor-State arbitrations are but
one type of arbitration to which UNCITRAL Rules apply. The Working
Group therefore concluded, for the purposes of the current round of
proposed rule changes, that “it would not be desirable to include specific

99

Levine, supra note 17, at 269.
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes:
Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, ¶ 5, U.N. DOC. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.145 (Dec.
6, 2006).
101
Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 39th Sess., June 19–July 7, 2006, ¶
184, U.N. DOC. A/61/17; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2006).
102
See, e.g., Kate Davies, Meeting the Challenge: Efficiency and Flexibility in
International Commercial Arbitration, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE
TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2011, at 1, 1 (Steven Finizio & Wendy Miles eds., 2011).
103
Report of the Working Group Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 2.
100
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provisions on treaty-based arbitration in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
themselves.”104
After revisions to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were issued in
2010, the Commission revisited the complex but worthy issue of creating
transparency standards for investor-State arbitrations.
After much
deliberation, the Working Group II reached a consensus in February 2013
as to the form, application, and content of the new transparency
standards.105 Rather than probing these proposed standards that still face
additional scrutiny, 106 this Part discusses the policy considerations
underlying the finalized draft. Importantly, this Part advocates for adopting
an approach that best pursues UNCITRAL’s objectives while preserving
party autonomy—even if such a rubric scales back the broadest application
of the transparency standards.
A. The Form of New Legal Transparency Standards
The Working Group has the discretion to determine the form of its
future work product on transparency standards.107 Determining the form of
the new legal standards is both a technical and policy-driven exercise.
Form selection is technical in one sense because transparency standards can
take shape in only one of many forms, and policy-driven in another sense
because the selected form will affect the drafting style and application of
transparency standards. 108 Among the possibilities of instruments are
“model clauses, specific rules or guidelines, an annex to the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules in their generic form, separate arbitration rules or optional
clauses for adoption in specific treaties.”109
Much debate over the issue of form has transpired among Working

104

Id. ¶ 69.
See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Rep. of Working Group (Arbitration and
Conciliation) on the work of its 58th Sess., New York, U.S., Feb. 4–8, 2013, ¶¶ 75–80, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/765 (Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group Fifty-Eighth
Session]. The Working Group II met in October 2012 and reached a consensus on some, but
not all, the transparency issues raised. Johnson, supra note 14. The Working Group II
reconvened in early February 2013 where it finalized a draft proposal of the rules. Peterson,
supra note 14. The proposal still needs to be approved by the Commission at its next
meeting in July 2013 and amended into the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules. Id.
106
The proposed standards “must still be subjected to a ‘legal scrub’ and then approved
by the UNCITRAL Commission at its next meeting in July [2013] . . . .” Peterson, supra
note 14. The Working Group II reached a consensus on new standards “that will apply on a
default basis to UNCITRAL arbitrations pursuant to future investment treaties – unless the
parties to a given treaty expressly opt-out.” Id. For more details on the proposed rules, see
Report of the Working Group Fifty-Eighth Session, supra note 105.
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See Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 1.
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Id. ¶ 24.
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Group II delegates, as well as NGOs and leading international arbitrators,
over the past half-decade. The issue has largely rested on whether and how
to incorporate new transparency standards into the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules. While the drafters of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules consciously
designed the Rules generically to allow for adjustments to the “varied
circumstances” that arise in investor-State arbitrations, the Rules were
primarily intended to govern commercial disputes and did not contemplate
the public interest and international law issues that come up.110
On October 12, 2007, more than forty renowned international
arbitrators signed and issued a declaration (Milan Declaration) through the
Chamber of National and International Arbitration of Milan. 111 The
proponents of the Milan Declaration advocate for preserving confidentiality
in international commercial arbitration and excluding any investor-State
provisions from the generic UNCITRAL Rules.112 It expresses reservations
about the possible inclusion of transparency provisions in the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules. Many delegates hold the view that the generic nature of
the Rules needs to be preserved and that full transparency in all
circumstances is not desirable. 113 Rather than incorporating specific
provisions into the UNCITRAL Rules, some delegates support the
utilization of investment treaties to expressly deal with issues surrounding
more open dealings. This alternative would “better allow States to reflect
such circumstances”114 and accommodate the desire for greater
transparency based on individual treaties. Others support preparing “one or
more optional clauses to address specific factors for investor-State
arbitration[s] . . . for consideration by States when negotiating such
treaties.”115
A contrasting viewpoint on the form for transparency standards has
been expressed by two prominent NGOs: the Centre for International
Environmental Law (CIEL) and the International Institute for Sustainable

110

PAULSSON & PETROCHILOS, supra note 8, at 1–4; Sutcliffe & Sabater, supra note 11.
Sutcliffe & Sabater, supra note 11, at 33–34.
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See Report of the Working Group Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 2, annex II (“The
members of the Milan Club of Arbitrators: 1) reaffirmed their support for the general
principle of confidentiality in international commercial arbitrations and, in particular, in
arbitrations taking place under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; 2) supported the current
proposals in the Working Group to exclude from the new UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules any
specific provision for investor-State arbitrations; [and] 3) recommended that one or more
optional clauses be formulated by UNCITRAL to address specific factors for investor-State
arbitrations taking place under investment treaties, consistent with the new UNCITRAL
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Development (IISD). 116 CIEL and IISD submitted a report (CIEL-IISD
Report) to the Working Group calling for greater transparency of
investment arbitration cases conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules “so
that citizens know what is at stake[,] . . . can be informed about the
outcome[,] . . . [and] have the opportunity to provide input to an investorState tribunal.”117 In order to accomplish the stated objectives, the CIELIISD Report proposed revision of the UNCITRAL Rules themselves,
revisions centered on issues of access to awards, access to the notice of
arbitration, access to oral hearings, access to materials during proceedings,
and third-party participation.118 The CIEL-IISD Report claims that direct
incorporation of these revisions in the Rules “would not affect the
resolution of commercial disputes” 119 but would avoid “undue delay,
disruption or cost” by leaving untouched the application of the Rules to
other types of arbitrations.120
The view advocated by CIEL and IISD has been countered by a
concern that the proposal to directly revise several UNCITRAL Rules is
overly simplistic when dealing with the complexities of transparency
issues.121 The complexities in dealing with transparency require more than
amending a few provisions in the UNCITRAL Rules, as there are “other
aspects that might need to be dealt with in investor-State arbitration, such as
the question of applicable law, or State immunity.” 122
In balancing these views, it appears the Working Group II was intent
on including a specific regime to the UNCITRAL Rules in the form of an
annex or a supplement. 123 The transparency standards would only apply in
the context of investment arbitrations, while the general regime of the
UNCITRAL Rules would remain unchanged with respect to commercial
arbitrations. While suggestions on the form of transparency standards have
varied, there has been general consensus that investment arbitrations have
different needs from commercial arbitrations, and that the UNCITRAL
Rules are designed to address the latter. 124 An annex or supplement to the
116

Report of the Working Group Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 2, annex III.
Id.
118
Id.
119
CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., REVISING THE
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES TO ADDRESS STATE ARBITRATIONS (2007), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_revising_uncitral_arbitration.pdf.
120
Report of the Working Group Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 2, annex III.
121
Id. ¶ 66.
122
Id.
123
The form of an annex to the existing UNCITRAL Rules was most supported by
delegates of Working Group II. Pedro Martini, Full Report on the 53rd Session of the
UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), MOOT ALUMNI ASS’N 11 (Oct.
4, 2010), http://www.maa.net/uploads/MAA_Docs/WGII_full_report.pdf.
124
Id. at 2–3.
117
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generic UNCITRAL Rules would address the need for greater openness in
investment arbitrations while leaving the integrity of the general rules
unchanged. Moreover, an annex would allow for more flexibility in
addressing complex transparency issues, such as exemptions to certain
rules, than the alternative of fitting all transparency issues into the existing
framework of the UNCITRAL Rules.
Thus, constructing transparency standards in the form of an annex to
the UNCITRAL Rules would restrict the sphere of application of the new
transparency standards to UNCITRAL arbitrations. While the scope of the
legal standards can be broadened by taking shape in the form of a Model
Law,125 packaging the transparency standards as an annex appropriately
applies them to parties who have expressly selected to arbitrate their
disputes under the UNCITRAL Rules. This is critical to recognizing that
any form of arbitration, investment or commercial, is based on the consent
of the parties.126
B. The Enforceability of Rules over Guidelines
However the new transparency standards are ultimately incorporated
into the UNCITRAL Rules—whether they are drafted as part of the existing
rules in relevant clauses, or as a supplement in the form of an annex to the
generic rules—the enforceability of new legal standards should be taken
into consideration. The weight of legal authority the new standards will
have over investment treaties will depend on whether they take form as
guidelines or stand-alone rules.127 The selection between guidelines or rules
has other significant implications: it will drive the drafting style of the legal
standard on transparency, and it will determine the force of the instrument’s
application on disputing parties. This Comment takes the position that in
order to establish the legitimacy of transparency standards among the
125

The UNICTRAL Model Law is a nonbinding legal framework based on best
principles of international arbitration. Juliet Blanch, John Reynolds & Andy Moody,
UNCITRAL and NY Convention, in ARBITRATION WORLD: JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISONS
cxliii, clvii (J. William Rowley ed., 2d ed. 2006). Since the U.N. Model Law is based on
nonbinding principles, it has the capacity to have broader impact than binding laws as it is
widely used as a tool for assisting the interpretation of national laws on arbitration. Id. The
U.N. Model Law was created to encourage the harmonization of arbitration laws around the
world and has been successful in that aim since its inception; over forty countries around the
world have adopted the U.N. Model Law. Id.
126
See Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 1270.
127
This Comment considers guidelines to be inclusive of model clauses and model
statement of principle, distinguished from stand-alone rules. For an example of the Working
Group’s consideration of the forms of a legal standard on transparency, see Report of the
Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 23; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law
Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Preparation of a Legal Standard on
Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.162
(Dec. 9, 2010).
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international community, create a uniform application, and promote greater
adoption of the standards, UNCITRAL should fashion its transparency
standards in the form of rules instead of guidelines.
1. Guidelines as a Possibility
Guidelines that outline legal standards on transparency would reflect
the UNCITRAL’s understanding of the international best practice of
promoting greater openness in investment arbitrations. Guidelines would
embrace principles of transparency and draw upon current practices, case
law, and the experience of the Working Group II and others in international
arbitration.128 Significantly, “guidelines are not legal provisions and do not
override any applicable national law or arbitral rules chosen by the
parties.”129
The success in implementing guidelines hinges on their general
acceptance by the international arbitration community, which requires
broad-based support for the principles laid out in the instrument. 130
Guidelines can have a significant influence over arbitration proceedings;
examples of guidelines that have seen success in their application to
consenting parties include the International Bar Association Rules on the
Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration and the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004).131 The Working
Group II hopes that its proposed guidelines will assist arbitrators,
institutions, and courts in their decision-making and practice on the issue of
transparency in investment arbitrations. 132
The Working Group II saw some support for guidelines at its fiftyfourth working session held in New York. 133 Germany presented arguments
128
See generally INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA G UIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
5
(2004),
available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=E2FE5E72-EB14-4BBAB10D-D33DAFEE8918.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
The IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence and the Unidroit Principles of International
Commercial Contract were submitted to the UNCITRAL Working Group II as examples of
functional and effective guidelines. Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session,
supra note 3, ¶ 23; see generally IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, INT’L B. ASS’N (May
29,
2010),
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#conf
lictsofinterest; INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS
2004
(2004),
available
at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf.
132
See generally INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 128, at 5.
133
See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial
Disputes, Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration: Proposals by
Governments and International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.164 (Dec. 20,
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(German Proposal) in favor of legal transparency standards in the form of
non-binding guidelines. 134 The German delegation asserted that “nonbinding guidelines most closely comply with the principle of a partydominated process that underpins arbitration.”135 Furthermore, the German
Proposal criticized the alternative of preparing an instrument in the form of
rules. The deliberation parties engage over whether to incorporate the new
transparency standards in arbitration proceedings “would be contentious,
possibly leading to additional expense and delays.”136
The German Proposal mostly emphasized its desired objective to
“establish the widest possible acceptance of transparency rules.”137
According to the Proposal, non-binding guidelines would help achieve the
stated objective by providing sufficient flexibility—unlike rigid, mandatory
rules—in the ad hoc application of transparency standards to existing and
future investment treaties. 138 Guidelines would, under this view, effectuate
a broader application of transparency standards than defined rules attached
to UNCITRAL, because guidelines allow parties to incorporate
transparency rules into their treaties regardless of the arbitration rules to
which they submit their dispute.
The guidelines would apply to
international treaties at the intergovernmental level and to private contracts
between States and investors. 139
2. The Case for Rules over Guidelines
The case for designing transparency standards in the form of rules
prevails over the form of guidelines, because rules carry greater weight in
legitimacy and enforcement, in addition to providing more clarity and
uniformity in facilitating arbitrations. Additionally, Germany’s supposition
that rules may exacerbate the “party-dominated process” in arbitral
proceedings may be rebutted: the application of transparency standards will
require the express consent of parties to a treaty to arbitrate under any
version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 140
Rules have greater force in facilitating arbitrations than guidelines.
Unless the disputing parties expressly agree otherwise, guidelines or
interpretations are swallowed by the governing arbitration rules when there
is a conflict. For example, open hearings for NAFTA investment treaties
are subject to the governing ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility, or
2010).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 2.
136
Id. at 3.
137
Id. at 2.
138
Id.
139
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 133, at 2.
140
See infra Part V.C (discussing the application of the new transparency standards).
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UNCITRAL Rules even though the NAFTA States have consented to open
hearings through their Open Hearings Statement.141 Arbitrating under the
UNCITRAL Rules requires the consent of the claimant party for hearings to
be made open,142 so a disputing party can veto the other party’s desire to
hold an open hearing. Thus, investment treaties to which NAFTA
governments are a party are still bound by administering rules selected by
the investor at the time of arbitration.143
The form of the transparency instrument will affect the drafting style
and application of the legal standards. The Working Group II indicated a
strong preference for drafting the legal standard in the form of clear rules
rather than looser, more discursive guidelines. 144 By drafting guidelines,
the legal standard would be less forceful in style and practice. Where
guidelines consist of lengthier explanations to parties and present various
options parties can choose from, their content will be less definitive in style
and more disjointed in application than rules. Without the clear and
uniform approach that rules can deliver, disputing parties in investment
arbitrations will be left with unpredictable and inconsistent transparency
standards.
The United Nations has recognized that UNCITRAL—through its
work in international trade law and status as a U.N. body—has an essential
role in advancing good governance and promoting the rule of law at the
national and international levels in the interest of economic and social
development.145 The Working Group II acknowledged this responsibility in
expressing its preference for a transparency instrument in the form of rules:
[H]igh standards on transparency in treaty-based investor-State
arbitration should be established because transparency contribute[s]
to promoting the rule of law, good governance, due process and
rights to access information. It [is] also seen as an important step to
respond to the increasing challenges regarding the legitimacy of
international investment law and arbitration as such . . . [thus] the
legal standard on transparency should take the form of detailed rules
of procedure . . . .146

141

See Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, supra note

55.
142

See Menaker, supra note 59, at 155.
See Teslik, supra note 52.
144
Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 25.
145
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 58/76, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/76 (Jan. 8, 2004) (“[T]he United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law will be of further assistance to States, in
particular developing countries, in promoting good governance and establishing an
appropriate legislative framework for such projects.”).
146
Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 25.
143
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Crystallizing greater public disclosure in the form of rules furthers the
United Nations objective of good governance and legitimizes the issue of
transparency in investment arbitrations, whereas non-binding guidelines
may diminish the force of transparency standards.
Finally, detailed rules of procedure would better provide “the certainty
contemplated by the objective of UNCITRAL to harmonize international
trade law.”147 UNCITRAL has noted that one way of furthering the
mandate to promote harmonization and unification of international trade
law “is to routinely collect and publish decisions and awards interpreting
and applying relevant legal texts.”148
Where current UNCITRAL
provisions are mostly silent on the issue of transparency, public disclosure
of awards and decisions are “random and incomplete.”149 Moreover, parties
arbitrating under nebulous guidelines are without a clearly uniform
approach to standards and are thus subject to case-by-case rulings by the
authorizing tribunal. Clear procedural rules on the disclosure of arbitration
proceedings will reduce uncertainties regarding legal transparency
standards. A legal instrument in the form of rules, therefore, is consistent
with UNCITRAL’s purpose of harmonizing the law of international trade.
Transparency standards should be legitimized by taking shape as rules.
Where the 1976 and 2010 UNCITRAL Rules were primarily designed to
govern commercial arbitrations between private parties, 150 an additional set
of rules on transparency should be available to address the demand for
transparency in investment disputes. Rules would take into consideration
distinct needs and interests of investor-State arbitrations and clear hurdles
147

Id.
NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., ENSURING TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
UNDER THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES
3
(2011), available
at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/ensuring_transparency.pdf; see generally U.N. Comm’n on
Int’l Trade Law, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT): User Guide, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.C/GUIDE/I/Rev.2 (June 2, 2010).
149
BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, supra note 148.
150
The 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were not specifically tailored to resolve
investor-State disputes or entertain claims for breach of customary or conventional
international law. Article 1(1) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, for example, refers only to
“disputes in relation to [a] contract.” Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 9th
Sess., Apr. 12–May 7, 1976, U.N. Doc. A/31/17, ch. V, § C; GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No.
17
(1976)
[hereinafter
1976
UNCITRAL
Arbitration
Rules],
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1976-e/vol7-p9-82-e.pdf (last visited Mar.
5, 2013); see also 1976 - UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON
INT’L
TRADE
L.,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html
(last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (“[T]he UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide a comprehensive
set of procedural rules upon which parties may agree for the conduct of arbitral proceedings
arising out of their commercial relationship and are widely used in ad hoc arbitrations as
well as administered arbitrations.”).
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466

UNCITRAL’s Unclear Transparency Instrument
33:439 (2013)

presented by the generic UNCITRAL Rules originally designed for
commercial purposes. 151
C. The Application of Transparency Standards
While the Working Group II enjoyed broad consensus in favor of
adopting transparency standards, its delegates were at “loggerheads over
whether it [was] permissible to read new [transparency] rules” into existing
treaties.152 The issue churned a substantial amount of debate among
Working Group II delegates, since the applicability of the new transparency
rules would have “an important practical impact as there [are] more than
2,500 investment treaties in force to date, but less than [ten] treaties had
been concluded in 2010.”153
Depending on the form of the new standards, UNCITRAL could apply
the transparency standards to both existing and future treaties. The issue of
the standards’ applicability is a complicated one. The Commission needs to
account for a number of legal and policy considerations related to treaties
existing prior to the Commission’s official issuance of the transparency
standards (anticipated for July 2013). Even though the UNCITRAL
Commission has reached broad consensus on the “importance of ensuring
transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration”154 and has stated that
achieving greater transparency is “a desirable objective,”155 UNCITRAL
should not overstep its boundaries in enforcing new legal standards without
the consent of the parties.
1. Applicability of the Rules on Transparency to Existing Treaties
The Working Group II explored a number of possible instruments that
would facilitate an application of the new transparency standards to existing
treaties.156 Among the buffet of potential solutions were automatic
applications to all treaties, or applications only upon the express consent of
the arbitrating parties. The applicability of the new standards remains a

151

See 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 150.
Julie A. Maupin, Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad,
and the Murky, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript
at 10 n.55), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2058195.
153
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and
Conciliation) on the work of its 53d Sess., Oct. 4–8, 2010, ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/712 (Oct.
20, 2010) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group Fifty-Third Session].
154
Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 1.
155
Id.; Report of the Working Group Fifty-Eighth Session, supra note 105, ¶ 75.
156
Possible solutions discussed by the Working Group II are joint interpretative
statements, unilateral declarations, amendments to treaties, automatic application of the new
standards, and a convention of the States. See generally U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law
Secretariat, supra note 127.
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contentious topic among the Working Group II delegates. Accordingly, this
Comment reviews the merits to both sides of the debate and concludes that
the new transparency standards should automatically apply to future
treaties, and apply to existing treaties only when parties give express
consent.
Some delegates proposed the “opt-in approach,” where the new
transparency standards would apply to existing treaties only where express
consent has been provided by the parties subject to the arbitration.157
Others, such as Canada and the United States, rejected this option and
instead advocated for an “out-out approach” that would automatically apply
the new standards to existing treaties unless parties specifically referred to
another version of the UNCITRAL Rules. 158
Significantly, the
deliberations expose underlying policy concerns, such as maximizing
widespread adoption of transparency standards versus preserving parties’
intent in the arbitration process. Both policy considerations are worthwhile
goals that tug at different approaches to applying the standards. However,
an optimal balance to realizing both ends can be achieved by treating
existing and future treaties differently through: (1) an opt-out approach to
future treaties, and (2) an opt-in approach to existing treaties.
An opt-out approach to existing treaties would embrace the new
transparency standards as the default rule, which is objectionable in spite of
its advantages. The new standards, “like other provisions of the
UNCITRAL arbitration rules, will be deemed to apply unless the State
parties to the treaty specified otherwise.”159 Where an investment treaty
expressly refers to a prior version of the governing UNCITRAL Rules, 160 an
automatic application of any newly amended rules would not be possible.
However, where an investment treaty refers generally to the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules without any further indication of a version, the treaty
would be interpreted to have made a “dynamic reference” to the evolution
of the Rules.161 In other words, a general reference to the UNCITRAL
Rules implies the “treaty parties . . . consented to a dynamic reference to
those rules and contemplated that the rules in force at the time the dispute
was initiated would apply.”162 The applicability of the new standards to

157

See id.
See Maupin, supra note 152, at 10.
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NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & LISE JOHNSON, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW
& INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., COMMENTS ON DRAFT RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN
INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION
5
(2011),
available
at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/uncitral_comments_draft_rules.pdf.
160
Parties to a dispute can expressly request arbitration under a specific version of the
UNCITRAL Rules. See, e.g., 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 150.
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Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 37.
162
BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & JOHNSON, supra note 159, at 6.
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existing treaties would be conditional on the intention of the parties: treaties
explicitly referencing a version of the UNCITRAL Rules would be subject
to those rules, even if they were not in force at the time of the dispute.
The driving motivation behind an opt-out approach is to enable the
new transparency standards—as default rules for existing treaties—to have
a broader application to investment arbitrations, thus “furthering the
mandate by the Commission to enhance transparency in treaty-based
investor-State arbitration.”163 Otherwise, the limitations of an opt-in
approach would have minimal impact on the 2,500 existing treaties, and
transparency reforms may see little change to the status quo. Moreover, the
tremendous proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties in
recent decades points to the potential for significant disparity on the impact
of the new rules on transparency should the legal standards only apply to
future treaties.164 The U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative on
Business and Human Rights submitted a proposal to the Commission
advocating for the widest application of transparency standards in
investment arbitrations by highlighting the concern that treating existing
treaties differently from future treaties would result in an undesirable “twotiered” set of arbitrating practices:
[T]ransparency [is] an integral part of UNCITRAL’s Arbitration
Rules as they apply to investor-State dispute resolution. I also hope
that appropriate rules for transparency will not be limited solely to
disputes under future agreements or treaties, but will apply equally to
those that arise from such existing arrangements that rely on
UNCITRAL’s rules. It is important that your work not result in
setting two tiers of practices, two sets of differing standards,
depending only on when the relevant treaty or agreement was
signed.165

From a human-rights advocacy perspective, the desire for a broad,
consistent application of transparency rules is clear, regardless of whether
the treaty was signed before the new standards are introduced. As desirable
as the objective may be, this Comment argues that UNCITRAL—as a
public intergovernmental body—is limited by its scope of authority in
enforcing new legal standards and should remain faithful to basic
arbitration principles of party consent.
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Report of the Working Group Fifty-Third Session, supra note 153, ¶ 86.
See Tuck, supra note 16, at 885–86.
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Rachel Davis, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-Gen. on the Issue of
Human Rights & Transnat’l Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., Statement to the UNCITRAL
Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) (Feb. 7–11, 2011), available at
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie-statement-uncitral-workinggroup-ii.pdf.
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While transparency standards may be desirable and their automatic
application to existing treaties would certainly result in greater adoption,
UNCITRAL does not have the authority to unilaterally impose new legal
standards on States. The introduction and application of a new legal
standard to existing treaties “constitute[s] an amendment to the treaty
provision on dispute settlement, which could not be done without the
agreement of the treaty parties, who are ‘masters’ of their treaty.”166
Arbitration is based on two parties’ consent, while an investment treaty
between States is governed by international law pursuant to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which prohibits any amendments to a
treaty without the consent of the parties to the treaty.167 The Vienna
Convention provides as a general rule of treaty interpretation that a “treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.”168
An approach that takes into consideration conscious decision-making
by the parties “complie[s] with public international law and practice.”169 A
dynamic interpretation of the treaties is thus impermissible by the standards
of international law, and UNCITRAL—as an intergovernmental body—
would overstep its authority if it retroactively applied the new standards to
existing treaties. Therefore, an opt-in approach, which preserves parties’
intent, should prevail with existing treaties. Otherwise, UNCITRAL could
face legal challenges for violating the terms of existing treaties and for
improperly applying international law.
Moreover, the opt-in approach remains consistent with the approach
adopted by the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules. The approach is reflected in
Article 1.2 of the Rules:
The parties to an arbitration agreement concluded after 15 August
2010 shall be presumed to have referred to the Rules in effect on the
date of commencement of the arbitration, unless the parties have
agreed to apply a particular version of the Rules. That presumption
does not apply where the arbitration agreement has been concluded
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U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 127, ¶ 28.
Christoph Schreuer, United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Course on Dispute
Settlement—Module
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Arbitration,
at
1,
UN
Doc.
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.2
(2003),
available
at
http://unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add2_en.pdf; Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties arts. 39–41, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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Vienna Convention, supra note 167, art. 31.1.
169
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and
Conciliation) on the work of its 56th Sess., June 25–July 6, 2012, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc.
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by accepting after 15 August 2010 an offer made before that date.170

The 2010 UNCITRAL Rules do not presumptively apply to
agreements made prior to the date of their enactment. This approach was
justified partially by the fact that the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules did not
contain any presumption that they would be subject to amendments.171
Likewise, the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules do not contain any presumption that
agreements are subject to amendments. The issues of applicability—from
the 1976 to the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, and from the generic rules to the
new transparency standards—are similar, and should thus be treated
similarly. Any new transparency standard should be consistent with the
approach adopted by the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules. Taking a different
approach would otherwise create confusion and legal uncertainty in the
international arbitration community.
Parties may opt-in to the transparency standards by issuing a joint
interpretative declaration. The Vienna Convention provides that “any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of the provisions” shall be taken into account,
together with the context, as having the effect of an authentic
interpretation.172
A joint interpretative statement by parties to an
investment treaty could express the agreement between the States “that the
provision of the treaty providing for investor-State arbitration should be
interpreted as including [or excluding] the application of the legal standard
on transparency.”173
A joint interpretative declaration, according to the Vienna Convention,
does not require any special form, “but would clearly have to demonstrate
the intention of the parties that their declaration constitutes an agreed basis
for interpretation.”174 Parties to a treaty should have the opportunity to
issue an interpretation of which rules govern their existing treaties. Joint
interpretative declarations “may be viewed as coming close to a
modification or amendment of the original treaty.”175 Even if subsequent
declarations deviate from the original intention of the agreement,
international courts and tribunals have accepted these declarations as
authentic interpretations of the treaty.176 A joint interpretative declaration
should thus be a tool to opt-in to a desired version of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, as it preserves the fundamental principle that
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2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, art. 1.2.
Report of the Working Group Fifty-Third Session, supra note 153, ¶ 87.
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Vienna Convention, supra note 167, art. 31.3(a).
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U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 127, ¶ 34.
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Id. ¶ 34; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 167, art. 31.3(a).
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international arbitration is based on the consent between parties.
2. Applicability of the Rules on Transparency to Future Treaties
While deference is given to parties’ consent in existing treaties, the
focus should shift to ensuring the widest application of transparency
standards to future treaties. This is because an opt-in approach to existing
treaties and an opt-out approach to future treaties strike an optimal balance
of policy goals: greater transparency in investor-State arbitrations where
arbitration is based on the consent of parties.
Under an opt-out solution, there would be a presumption that the
transparency standards would apply to future treaties referring to the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, unless a reference to a different version of
the Rules was made in the treaty. 177 A reference to the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules in future treaties would therefore include a presumed
reference to the transparency standards.
Accordingly, transparency
standards would apply unless States otherwise expressly opt-out of the legal
standards—the approach proposed by the Working Group II.178 This
presumption could be clarified with an amendment to the 2010 UNCITRAL
Rules, where Article 1 could state that an arbitration agreement concluded
after the effective date of the new transparency standards shall be presumed
to have referred to the version of the UNCITRAL Rules in effect on the
date of commencement of the arbitration, unless the parties agreed to apply
a particular version of the Rules. 179
Including the new transparency standards in the default version of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules for future treaties accomplishes two main
policy objectives. First, it situates a “wider application of the legal standard
on transparency, and thereby ensure that the mandate given by the
Commission to the Working Group to promote transparency to [investorState arbitrations] would be better fulfilled.”180 Second, it avoids
undermining the force and applicability of the Working Group II’s new
transparency standards. Unlike the case with existing treaties, a different
approach from the opt-in solution is recommended for future treaties
177
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because UNCITRAL does not have to violate public international law by
retroactively applying new legal standards to treaties completed prior to the
effective date of the transparency standards. Under the opt-out option,
treaty parties still retain the power not to submit to the new standards. The
opt-out solution provides the greatest flexibility in scope of the standards’
application to future treaties, while respecting the treaty parties’ intent in
both existing and future investment treaties.
Furthermore, an amendment to the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules that
clarifies the presumption of the applicability of transparency standards
provides future parties notice of the default legal standards. Parties to
investor-State arbitration can consciously elect the UNCITRAL Rules
effective at the commencement of the arbitration, knowing that the
presumption in favor of the transparency standards exists, and explicitly
reference a different version of the UNCITRAL Rules in the treaty if they
prefer it to govern certain disputes or aspects of the dispute. In order to
promote a greater adoption of the new standards in investor-State
arbitrations, the burden should be placed on the arbitrating parties to opt-out
of the new status quo favoring transparency.
Adopting an opt-out approach remains consistent with the approach
followed by the Working Group II for the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules.181 For
investment treaties concluded after the effective date of the 2010
UNCITRAL Rules, there is a presumption that a reference to the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules refers to the 2010 version of the Rules,
unless the parties to the treaty agree otherwise. 182 Likewise, the same
presumption regarding transparency standards should be practiced in order
to limit confusion and uncertainty about the applicability of future
amendments and newly developed standards to the UNCITRAL Rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
While there has been broad consensus in the international arbitration
community in favor of increased transparency in investment arbitrations,
UNCITRAL faces complexities in designing the structure of the new
standards. Determining the form and application of new transparency
standards, designed for incorporation into the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules (just recently revised for the first time in three decades), is more than
a technical exercise.
UNCITRAL must factor in weighty policy
considerations and balance the law of treaties respecting party consent with
the objective of achieving greater transparency in investment arbitrations.
Any new transparency standard in investor-State arbitration must be drafted
in a way that will have wide traction and acceptance by State-parties to
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disputes, both with regards to existing and future treaties. At the same time,
UNCITRAL must be guided by the basic arbitration principle of party
consent: the new standards endorsing greater transparency should remain
within the boundaries set by the international law of treaties.
When considering the form in which the transparency standards should
be drafted, UNCITRAL should fashion binding rules as opposed to
nonbinding guidelines. This choice will have significant implications on
the instrument’s drafting style and force of application on disputing parties.
A legal instrument taking the form of an annex to the existing UNCITRAL
Rules will help establish the legitimacy of transparency among the
international community, create a uniform application, and promote greater
adoption of the transparency standards while mostly leaving unaltered the
original purpose of UNCITRAL Rules governing commercial arbitrations.
Moreover, given that the UNCITRAL Commission has reached broad
consensus on the “importance of ensuring transparency in treaty-based
investor-State arbitration,”183 and has stated that achieving greater
transparency is “a desirable objective,”184 the Commission should adopt a
provision that promotes the broadest application of legal transparency
standards. Among the menu of potential solutions, the Commission should
adopt a provision that requires the express consent of parties to an existing
treaty in order for the new transparency standards to apply. For future
treaties, the new transparency standards should be the default set of
applicable UNCITRAL Rules, unless the treaty parties expressly opt-out by
referencing a prior version of the Rules.
Foisting new rules onto investment arbitrations have more open-ended
implications on governments than private commercial parties. Whereas
commercial parties select their counterparties when entering into an
arbitration agreement, sovereigns become a party to investment arbitrations
without directly agreeing with the other side. The introduction of new
standards governing investor-State arbitrations thus leaves sovereign parties
with greater uncertainty about the impact the new rules will have on present
and future treaties. Therefore, UNCITRAL should pay tribute to the
principle of party consent by not imposing new transparency standards as
the default applicable rules to existing treaties without the express
permission of the parties.
This Comment recommends these measures of form and application of
transparency standards in hopes that they only augment the force of
effectiveness and legitimacy of the original UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules—which today remains one of the most widely recognized set of rules
in the context of international arbitration.
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